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1 Introduction  
 
Among the various factors mentioned to explain the increased wage dispersion in several 
Western countries in the 1980s and 1990s3 the most popular reason seems to be the demand shift 
in favor of highly skilled workers (see, Bound and Johnson, 1992, or Katz and Murphy, 1992). 
This shift could explain the growing wage gap between groups of workers with different levels of 
education and experience. But it could also be a determinant of the increase in within groups 
(such as those defined on the basis of age and education) inequality (see, Juhn, Murphy and 
Pierce, 1993).  
This increase in the demand for skills is likely to lead to an upgrading of the skills, whether it is 
initiated by firms or workers. What would then be the impact on the wage structure of such an 
upgrading of skills? Very few studies seem to have taken a look at this issue. Constantine and 
Neumark (1996), using the January 1983 and 1991 Current Population Survey (CPS), found for 
example that in the United States training was quite valuable though its effect on between 
educational groups wage dispersion was not important. They argue that  “the changes in the 
distribution of training were not sufficiently large to have substantial effects on the wage 
structure”. 
Another interesting study is that of Marcotte (2000). Using data from cohorts of the National 
Longitudinal Surveys he found that young men entering the labor market beginning in the late 
1960s and those entering in the early 1980s differed little in the average incidence of training or 
earnings premium associated with training. He concluded, however, that shifts in training towards 
more educated workers could account for more than 40% of the observed increase in college-
high school earnings differences among young men. Changing patterns in continuing learning 
nevertheless do not help explain the growth in earnings differences within equally educated 
groups. 
Blundell et al. (1999) looked at the impact of training on the wage profile of individuals in the 
United Kingdom over the period between 1981 and 1991, controlling for two types of 
endogeneity. The first one is related to permanent differences among individuals in their 
propensity to participate in training, which are correlated with earnings and returns to training. 
The second source of endogeneity arises when firms that do well and hence are able to pay 
higher wages are also increasing their training levels or when individuals who “received a bad 
productivity shock” become eligible for training and find it less costly. They analyzed data from 
the British National Child Development Surwey, a continuing longitudinal survey of persons 
living in Great Britain, who were born in 1958. They checked who actually receives training and 
concluded that individuals who had undertaken Employer-provided training courses in 1981 were 
more likely to obtain training between 1981 and 1991. Moreover the probability of undertaking 
such an employer-provided training course increases with school qualification. As far as the 
returns to training are concerned, they found that employer-provided training leading to a 
qualification has positive returns, regardless of whether it was obtained with the current or a 
former employer. Informal employer- provided training on the contrary had much lower returns 
when a person moves, this clearly indicating that this type of training is rather firm specific. 
Blundell et al. (1999), however, did not look at the implications of their findings on the wage 
structure. 
In France access to training seems to be quite selective as it is much easier for individuals holding 
the “baccalauréat”4 or with two years of studies beyond it (see, Croquey, 1995, or Aventur and 
Hanchane, 1999). In fact the probability to receive on-the-job training appears to depend on the 
initial level of the human capital of the individual and to be positively correlated with his 
professional status in the firm, the nature of his work contract and the size of the firm. It seems 
that this probability increases also with seniority in the firm (see, Béret and Dupray, 2000). If this 
                                                                 
3 See Levy and Murnane, 1992, or Karoly, 1992, for a review of the evidence in the United States. 
4  National Diploma delivered at the end of High School. 
 3
is the case one could argue that there is a matching process in so far as training is first of all 
aimed at those who have proven they are well integrated in the firm. Training would then serve 
to “keep the workers in the firm” (see, Goux and Maurin, 1997) and have a weak impact on 
earnings unless the individual participates frequently in training programs (see, Béret and Dupray, 
1998). In short the goal of training would be to select and keep the most performing workers. 
The inequality in continued training that is observed between the firms would then be a 
testimony of the existence of segmented labor markets (see, Hanchane and Joutard, 1998). 
Past studies have estimated that the net impact of continued training on earnings is around 2%, 
once the set of characteristics related to the professional history of the individual and of the firm 
is controlled for. This was the result obtained by Béret and Dupray, 2000, on the basis of the 
1993 I.N.S.E.E.5 Survey on “Formation and Professional Qualification”. Similar findings appear 
in the study of Goux and Maurin (1997) who managed to neutralize the impact of the diversity in 
wage policies among firms. 
Such conclusions should be compared with what is observed in Germany. The breakdown of the 
wage gap, between those who received training and those who did not, shows that personal 
characteristics play a much more important role in France. But it turns out that this is a 
consequence of the selectivity bias, while in Germany this bias is not statistically significant (see, 
Béret and Dupray, 2000). In other words observed and unobserved individual characteristics play 
a much greater role in France as far as the probability to have access to training is concerned. But 
once this fact is taken into account, these characteristics, at the difference of what happens in 
Germany, do not have any significant impact on individual earnings (see, Goux and Maurin, 
1997, for the French case). A study conducted by OECD (see, OECD, 1999, pages 179-181) 
reached the same conclusion. Half of the earnings gap between those who received training and 
those who did not is due to the fact that the firms providing training pay higher salaries in any 
case. The second half of the gap is related to factors that have a simultaneous impact on the 
probability of access to training and on the earnings.6  
The importance of the second component of this earnings gap7 should be related to the fact that 
the presence of segmentation in the labor market is often explained by the existence of barriers to 
entry in the (good) jobs that belong to the primary sector8. It may be argued that these jobs are 
characterized by a pattern of skill formation that is based on on-the-job training policies that are 
very selective. As a consequence the fact that a worker receives on-the-job training may be a 
signal of his integration in the internal market. For the economist such a participation in on-the-
job training programs has therefore become a statistical criterion of segmentation because the 
two populations of the individuals who received and did not receive on-the-job training have 
unobserved characteristics that are very different. As a consequence the impact of on-the-job 
training on earnings should be computed, net of the effect of this unobserved heterogeneity.  
One may however wonder whether the significant impact of the unobserved heterogeneity on the 
average earnings gap between the two groups of individuals who receive and do not receive on-
the-job training is a sufficient condition for concluding that it serves as a criterion of 
segmentation. Assume we indeed find first that there is such a selectivity bias, second that there 
                                                                 
5 I.N.S.E.E. is the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies. 
6 In Germany the educative system is such that the knowledge accumulated at school has a high productive value 
and there is little uncertainty about the skills of those who hold a diploma. Continued training may then be 
considered as an additional way of improving the quality of the human capital of the workers and hence has a 
clear impact on earnings. In France on the contrary there is a lot of uncertainty about the skills of those who hold 
a diploma, specially at low and intermediate levels, so that firms will choose a strategy that progressively reveals 
the productive capacities of the workers. Such a matching process explains why access to training has to be 
selective and is mainly reserved to those workers who succeeded in overcoming the barriers to entry into internal 
markets. 
7 The data sources we used did not allow us to take into account the first component.  
8  The idea according to which barriers to entry represent a test of the hypothesis of segmentation is stressed by 
Dickens and Lang (19XX), Magnac (1991), Taubman and Wachter (19XX). 
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still remains a net (of the role played by the unobserved heterogeneity) effect of on-the-job 
training on earnings. If we then divide our sample of workers into two groups, the first one 
including those who did not receive training (say, group A), the second one those who did not 
(group B), we will necessarily observe that there the between groups (A and B) variance of (the 
logarithms of) earnings is significantly different from zero. There are then two possibilities. 
Either the within groups variance (of the logarithms) of earnings is important, or it is not. In the 
latter case this would imply that the unobserved heterogeneity that was found to have a 
significant impact on the probability to receive training and on the earnings themselves is in fact 
the “hidden” criterion for labor market segmentation. 
If however the within groups variance turns out to be important and in particular if it is much 
greater than the between groups variance, one would have to conclude that there is a great degree 
of overlapping between the two distribution of earnings, those of groups A and B. Assume that 
at least some of the explanatory (the observed) variables that have been taken into account in the 
earnings function have a significant impact on the earnings of both groups. One may imagine, for 
example, that some of these variables have an important impact on the earnings of one of the 
groups while some others have an effect on those of the other group. What should be clear 
however is that the division of the sample in two groups based on a distinction between those 
who received and those who did not receive on-the-job training is not really relevant because, 
under such an hypothesis, the between groups variance is assumed to be small compared to that 
of the within groups. As a consequence on-the-job training (unless the unobserved heterogeneity 
has also an important effect on the within groups variance) cannot be any more a relevant 
criterion of labor market segmentation.     
Testing such hypotheses remained a difficult task until very recently. New developments in 
income inequality decomposition techniques and in particular in the application of such 
techniques to regression analysis (see, Fields, forthcoming) allow us now to implement such tests 
because it has become possible to determine the exact impact of each variable not only on the 
overall variance of earnings but also on both the between and within groups dispersion, the 
groups referring here to those who received and did not receive on-the-job training.  
We will therefore proceed in three stages. First, as has often been done in the past, in estimating 
an earnings function that makes a correction for the selectivity bias related to the fact that an 
individual received or did not receive on-the-job training, we will be able to check the net effect 
(once this selectivity bias is taken into account) of such a training on earnings.  
Second by comparing the relative importance of the between and within groups dispersions of 
earnings we will find out whether there is a significant degree of overlapping between the 
distribution of earnings of the two groups previously mentioned (those who received and did not 
receive on-the-job training). 
Third by finally applying Fields’ (forthcoming) technique, we will be able to quantify the exact 
contribution of the observed (the explanatory) variables and of the unobserved individual 
characteristics on the variance of earnings. In particular we will be able to determine the impact 
of the unobserved heterogeneity on such a dispersion.   
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data sources while section 3 gives the 
estimates of the coefficients of the earnings function, after correcting for the selectivity bias. 
Section 4 presents the decomposition technique allowing the estimation of the exact impact of 
training and other variables on the various components of the earnings dispersion and gives the 
results of such a breakdown. Concluding comments are finally given in section 6. 
 
 
2 The data sources 
 
The survey 
 
 5
The analysis is based on a survey called « Continued Training 2000 ». This survey represents in 
fact an additional questionnaire that was part of the « Employment Survey » realized by the 
French Statistical Institute (I.N.S.E.E.) in March 2000. Whereas most of the information on 
continued training in France comes from firms, this survey was addressed to individuals, whether 
they received some kind of training or not. Its main interest is that it allows to observe the 
attitude of individuals vis-a-vis continued training, the constraints that may limit the access to 
training and the practices of those who receive this type of training.  
This survey covered individuals who were less than 65 years old, had completed their initial 
formation and were not in the army at the time of the survey. These individuals were surveyed in 
a face to face interview on the training they received during their active life, that is, since the end 
of their studies. More precisely these individuals were allowed to describe six training periods, the 
information they provided being the most detailed for the training received that was closest to 
January 1999. This latter information was indeed the one that formed the basis of our empirical 
analysis. 
 
The concept of training in the survey 
 
The originality of this survey is that it covers all types of training, whatever their goal, whether 
they had a (direct or indirect) professional objective or whether their aim was more personal. 
These types of training included therefore: 
- Practical training: courses taken within the framework of continued training, seminars and 
conferences attended. In other words training this type of training implies the presence of a 
specialized “trainer” in a location that is different from the workplace 
- On the job training: this training takes place on the job with the help of a tutor and it implies 
the utilization of the usual work tools. 
- Self-formation: here the individual trains himself/herself, eventually with the help of specific 
tools. This type of training includes what is called open formation or distance learning. 
- Alternative periods of training: this type refers to work contracts that request a period of 
training, mainly what is called in France “qualification contracts”. 
 
The other variables 
 
Educational Level 
Six categories of diploma have been considered: Higher education diploma, two years of study 
beyond the “baccalauréat”, “baccalauréat”, CAP or BEP9, BEPC10 and CEP11. 
 
Socio-Professional Category 
Six categories have been distinguished. Engineers or individuals having a managerial position, 
“intermediate professions”, “specialized” manual workers12 , “qualified” manual workers13, 
employees and other professions. 
 
Seniority 
For all the individuals seniority in the firm is that observed in March 2000.  
                                                                 
9 These are professional diploma whose preparation requires at least two years and towards which one starts 
studying after 7 to 9 years of school. 
 
10  In France after primary education (5 years), all pupils  follow a common curriculum at the « Collège » at the 
end of which they take the BEPC exam. 
 
11  This optional exam certifies that the individual completed primary school.    
12 « ouvriers spécialisés » in French. 
13 « ouvriers qualifiés » in French. 
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Duration of Work 
The exact number of hours per week is not known. There is however enough information to 
make a distinction between those working full-time, between 30 and 40 hours, between 15 and 30 
hours and less than 15 hours per week. 
 
Type of Work Schedule 
Here a distinction is made between those who have every week the same schedule, those who 
have an “alternate” schedule (e.g. working one week the day, the other at night) and those who 
have a flexible schedule. 
 
Training 
As mentioned before the training that is described with most details is that which took place the 
closest to January 1999. This is why the training variable refers to this training period.  
 
The population analyzed in the present study 
We have concentrated our attention on the private sector because we believe that in the public 
sector the selection process is different and the profitability of continued training takes different 
forms. In addition we have excluded what is called “alternative contracts” and “subsidized 
contracts” which by their nature imply a minimal number of hours of training, partly financed by 
the State. It is then clear that for this type of contracts questions relative to the side who took the 
initiative of the training are totally irrelevant. 
Note also that 90% of the individuals in the sample analyzed undertook the training for 
professional rather than for other reasons. We have therefore excluded individuals who 
undertook the training for personal or social reasons, whose goal was related to family, arts or 
sport or whose objectives were linked to responsibilities they have in the political world, in 
private associations or unions. In some cases the initiative of the training came from the 
employer. We then took into account, when this was relevant, the fact that the training was more 
or less imposed on the individual or that the individual was the only one in the firm, because of 
his/her specific qualifications, to receive such a training. 
We had also to eliminate the observations for which no data on earnings were available so that 
we ended up with a sample of 8261 individuals, among whom 2335 received some type of 
training during the last period covered by the survey. 
 
Summary Statistics 
Table 1 gives the mean values of the various variables. On average individuals who underwent 
training earn 29.6% more than those who did not undergo any form of training (this is the value 
of the difference between the logarithms of wages in the two groups). Several characteristics can 
explain such a difference. First the proportion of those who have a Higher Education Diploma is 
much higher (11.9% versus 4.5%) among those who received a form of training. The share of 
those who have the “baccalauréat” is also higher among the “trained” (17.4%versus 11.1%).  On 
the contrary the shares of those with a low level of education is higher among those who did not 
receive any training (see, the percentages for the variables “holds a CAP or BEP”, holds a 
“BEPC”, holds a CEP). Since earnings tend to increase with the level of education (see, below 
the results of the regression in Table 3) we have a first reason why earnings are higher among 
those who received training.  
Table 1 indicates also that the proportion of manual workers (whether “specialized” or 
“qualified”) is much higher among those who did not receive any training. On the contrary the 
share of engineers or of those having a managerial position, a category expected to have higher 
earnings, is much higher among those who received training. Differences between the two 
categories are small as far as the shares of employees, of other professions, of those having a 
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contract of undetermined duration, of other categories of trainees and of seniority in the firm are 
concerned. Age that is expected to have a positive effect on earnings is quite higher on average 
among those who did not receiwe any training (41.3 versus 39.8 for those who received training). 
The proportion of those working full time, a variable that certainly has a positive impact on 
monthly earnings, is slightly higher among those who received training (88.6% versus 82.3 among 
those who did not receive any training). The proportion of those who work part time between 15 
and 30 hours on the contrary is somehow higher among those who did not receive any training 
(2.3% versus 0.5% among those who received training).  
 
3 Estimating the Earnings Function  
 
3.1 The Determinants of On-the-Job Training 
 
In order to make a correction for the selectivity bias, we first estimated a Probit model14 which 
gives us the determinants of the access to the training15 that took place during the 14 months 
preceding the date at which the survey took place. As is well known, the main contribution of 
this first stage of the estimation procedure is to give the value of Mill’s ratio for each individual. 
The results of this Probit model nevertheless shed also some interesting light on the factors 
influencing the access to training (see, Table 2). They are in fact similar to those obtained in 
previous studies in France and show for example that the closer the links between the employer 
and the employee, the higher the probability of getting access to training. Therefore individuals 
working under a contract of fixed duration are less likely to receive training than those employed 
under a contract of indeterminate duration. Naturally those who have the highest probability of 
receiving training are the “trainees” (“stagiaires” in French). These employees receive an intensive 
training in order to be integrated in the firm as quickly as possible. 
Note also (see, Table 2) that men are more likely than women to benefit from training. Actually 
the reality is more complex. For full time contacts men have indeed a higher probability of 
receiving training but the situation is the opposite for part-time contracts (see, Hanchane and 
Lambert, 2002). It appears that such a training period imposes various monetary and non-
monetary costs on the family (such as finding substitutes to take care of the children) and these 
costs are not identical for men and women. What happens for part-time contracts seems in fact 
to indicate that women working part-time are employed in professions or sectors where the 
prevalence of training is usually important. 
One may also observe that the managerial staff and the professions that are at the intermediate 
level of the hierarchy (henceforth “intermediate professions”) are those who are the most likely 
to undertake a program of continued training. A more detailed analysis of the survey, making a 
distinction between the three kinds of training (standard training period16, Training received while 
working and self-formation), shows however differences. Thus one finds proportionally more 
manual workers (“ouvriers”) among those receiving training while working. In fact this kind of 
training is the most common in industries where manual workers are over-represented. 
Nevertheless, despite what characterizes the category called earlier “training received while 
working”, there is still a significant degree of inequality between the socio-professional groups17 
in the access to training. 
It is interesting to note that these differences are also present at the perception level. Thus, when 
asked whether in their firm the other employees undertake training, 78% of the managerial staff 
and the “intermediate professions” answered “yes” and 74% answered “yes”, whatever the level 
                                                                 
14  See, section I in the methodological Appendix, for a short presentation of why such a procedure has to be 
used. 
15  Whatever the type of training and the closest it was to January 1999. 
16 « Stage » in French. 
17 « Catégorie socio-professionnelle » in French. 
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of the worker. Manual workers are those who are the most likely to answer “no, never” (37% of 
them). However 9% of them say that the most qualified workers are those who receive training, 
the corresponding percentage being 7% in the whole surveyed population.    
The impact of the size of the firm is as expected: firms with more than 500 workers are those 
that proportionally invest the most in training. These firms are those where the type of training 
labeled earlier “training received while working” is the most frequent, hence the fact that these 
firms are those in which the low-skilled workers have the highest probability of receiving training. 
Note that what was called previously “training received while working” is in certain ways an 
innovative type of training and it seems to be easier to manage in big firms. This kind of training 
requires for example the presence of an individual personally responsible for the training of the 
trainee and such a requirement is evidently less constraining in big firms. 
 
3.2 The Returns to Training and the Coefficients of the Earnings Function 
 
The Probit model whose results have just been analyzed allowed us to estimate the Mills’ ratios 
that have then been introduced in the earnings function in order to make a correction for the 
selectivity bias.  In addition following Barnow et al. (1980) we have introduced in the regression a 
dummy variable equal to 1 for those who received training and to zero otherwise. The coefficient 
of this variable in the regression will then give us the impact on earnings of receiving training, 
once the selectivity bias is neutralized and, naturally, other things constant.  The other variables 
introduced in the regsession are as follows. There are five dummy variables giving the educational 
level (six categories) of the individual, five dummy variables giving the qualification level of the 
job (six categories) and two dummy variables describing the type of contract (three categories). 
We also introduced age and its square, seniority in the firm and its square, three dummy variables 
giving the weekly duration of work (4 categories) and finally two variables giving information on 
the type of work schedule (3 categories). 
The individual who serves as reference in the regression has a higher education diploma 
corresponding to two years of study after the “baccalauréat”, is a technician, has a fixed duration 
work contract, works between 15 and 30 hours per week and has an “alternate”18 work schedule. 
Table 3 indicates that earnings grow with the level of human capital. One may observe that those 
who hold a higher education diploma, ceteris paribus, earn 14% more than those who studied two 
years after the “baccalauréat” (the category of reference for the educational level), 20% more than 
those who have only the “baccalauréat”, 29% more than those who have a CAP or BEP, 31.4% 
more than those who have a BEPC and 41% more than those who have a CEP.  
As far as the socio-professional category is concerned, technicians, engineess and individuals who 
are part of the managerial staff earn significantly more than the other categories. Technicians are 
often individuals who studied two years beyond the “baccalauréat” in a technological section 
while engineers and managers are often graduate of the prestigious engineering schools or hold 
what is called a diploma of higher specialized studies (five years beyond the “ baccalauréat”). 
Note also that job security seems to play a discriminating role in so far as those having a work 
contract of undetermined duration earn more, ceteris paribus, than those having a fixed duration 
work contract or than trainees. 
Age and seniority have, as expected, a non linear effect but note the weak impact of seniority. 
Similar findings about the effect of seniority in France may be found in the works of Béret 
(1992), Goux and Maurin (1994) and Hanchane and Joutard (1998). These results are an 
illustration of the transformations that occurred on the French labor market as well as of its 
specificity when compared with other industrial countries. Before what is known in France as the 
“crisis”, which started in the mid 1970s, there was a close link between the worker and his job. 
Qualification was thus acquired progressively while working. The “crisis” which led to a stronger 
                                                                 
18 In the sense that he works a fixed number of hours per week but the timing of his work (e.g. morning versus 
afternoon) varies every week but on a regular basis. 
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emphasis on competitiveness displayed the rigidity of internal markets so that external markets 
became the preferred choice of those individuals who had acquired a minimal level of investment 
in education. As a consequence, though seniority increased, its return decreased, becoming 
sometimes even nil. Various studies such as those of Maurice, Sellier and Silvestre (1982), 
Silvestre (1986), Verdier (1997) and Béret (1992) have actually emphasized these transformations 
of the French labor market . 
We had no exact information on the number of hours worked by an individual during a given 
month. This is why we used the monthly and not the hourly wage as dependent variable. We 
were however able to partly control for the number of hours worked since, as indicated earlier, 
we knew whether the individual worked full time, between 30 and 40 hours, between 15 and 30 
hours or less than 15 hours per week. In addition information was available on the schedule of 
work: whether every week the individual had the same schedule, whether he had an “alternate” 
schedule (working for example one week during the day, the other at night) or whether his 
schedule was completely flexible. The results (see, table 3) indicate, as expected, that the more 
hours an individual works, the higher his earnings. It appears also that those who work according 
to a fixed schedule earn less than those who work under an “alternate” schedule. Such a 
compensating scheme however does not seem to exist for those who have a flexible schedule.  
Access to training has a significant impact but here, as mentioned previously, caution is required 
in the interpretation of the results. The impact of training on earnings has evidently to be 
computed "net of the selectivity effect". The presence of a selectivity bias (the coefficient of the 
Mills ratio is significant) implies that the unobserved heterogeneity affects both the probability to 
receive on-the-job training and the earnings themselves. The “net” effect of on-the-job training 
on earnings is therefore to increase the latter by 24%, the difference between the values of the 
coefficients of the variable “on-the-job training” (0.50) and of the Mills ratio (0.26). 
In order to better understand the various channels through which on-the-job training may have 
an impact on the earnings of those who received training we present in Table 4 the results of a 
regression, where we include only those individuals who received on-the-job training and the 
dependent variable is the residual of the earnings function (whose estimates are given in Table 3).  
 
3.3 The role played by the side that took the initiative of the training or/and financed it  
 
The explanatory variables in the regression whose results are given in Table 4 give information 
on the side that took the initiative of the training (individual, firm, both sides) and the way this 
training was financed.  This type of information allows us to identify the heterogeneity of the 
impact of training, depending on whose side took the initiative of the training and how the latter 
was financed. These two dimensions are in fact well connected to human capital theory.19 In the 
regression given in Table 4 the individual of reference is one whose training was initiated by 
employment services or delegates of the workers and financed by the employer. 
It appears that the forms of training that provide the highest rate of return are those that were 
initiated by the individual alone or by a common decision of the employer and the employee. 
These findings are consistent with the fact that general training gives higher returns. Such an 
individual initiative represents also a signal for the employer that the employee will do his/her 
best to make use of the training received. 
The fact that when the training was undertaken at the initiative of the individual, it has a greater 
impact on earnings raises naturally the issue of a possible ex post rationalization of the decision 
                                                                 
19  The distinction between general and specific training goes back to Becker (1993) and will not be recalled 
here. As is well known these are extreme cases. Very often the two sides share the financing of the training and 
hence its benefits and this sharing is a kind of insurance against any opportunistic behavior of the other side (a 
« quit » by the worker or a « layoff » by the employer). It is also expected that general training should give a 
higher return since in the case of specific training the employer may have the power to limit the sharing of the 
rent. 
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making. Some econometric tests that were undertaken to check such an hypothesis tend however 
to invalidate such a possibility.20 
The fact that the impact on earnings was higher when the employer financed the training seems 
to lead to a rejection of an explanation in terms of specific training. First it turns out that even 
when financed by the employer, some forms of training may be general, in the sense that they can 
be used elsewhere on the market place.21 Second it is possible that those who receive training are 
a more homogeneous group and are subject to greater selection when the employer finances the 
training. The idea is that the “productive impact” of the training depends first on the capacity 
shown by the employees to make use of this training, second on the probability that they will 
work in positions where such training is profitably used. If this is so one may expect a better 
selection of the trainees when the employer finances the training. Such an observation does not 
contradict the fact that training is more efficient when it was initiated by the employee or jointly 
by the employer and the employee. After all, nothing guarantees that all the individual or joint 
demands for training will be implemented and we have no data to estimate the probability that 
this happens. 
To better understand the complex links that may exist between the side taking the initiative of the 
training and that financing it, we have made some additional tests. We checked in particular 
whether, among those who received a training that was financed by the employer, the cases 
where the initiative of such a training was taken by the employer alone, had specific 
characteristics. Table 5 indicates that as far as the field of training is concerned there is no real 
difference between the two cases where the employer is involved. It appears however that in the 
fields of “Hygiene and Security” and of “Industrial Techniques” training is less common when it 
was initiated by the individual. This is also true for “Trade, Sales and Marketing”. It is possible 
that, at least for the two first cases, the productive context of the firm plays a role and thus the 
specificity of the firm would play a greater role. As far as the objective of the training is 
concerned, it seems that when the goal of the training is to obtain a diploma, individual initiative 
is more common, this being also true for the cases where a certification is to be received at the 
end of the training period. Note finally that the duration of the training period is almost triple 
when the initiative was taken by the employee. 
In short it seems that the individual is more involved when the duration of the training is longer 
and when it is validated by a diploma or a certification. This would seem to confirm that 
individuals look more for a form of training that is general rather than specific. This evidently 
implies that employees are not indifferent to the impact that their training may have on their 
mobility. 
 
                                                                 
20  In a first stage a dichotomic variable was introduced which was equal to one if  the earnings gap between 
1999 and 2000 was greater than 900 francs (30% of the cases). Then a bivariate probit model was estimated on 
the basis of such a variable and that measuring the side that took the initiative of the training. Such a model 
allows one to check whether there is a correlation between the error terms of the two equations. In other words 
we test here the possibility that unobserved characteristics such as motivation have an impact on both the 
increase in earnings between January 1999 and March 2000 and the fact that the individual said he (she) took the 
intitiative of the training. Such a correlation term turns out however never to be significant, whether one works 
with the whole sample of those who received training or with a sample which includes only those whose training 
was financed by the employer. 
Another technique was used to test this type of correlation. Here a conditional bivariate probit model was 
introduced so that the dichotomous variable indicating whether the increase in earnings was higher than 900 
francs became an explanatory variable of that representing the side that took the training intitiative (see, Greene, 
1998, and Woolridge, 2002). Here again no significant effect was observed.  
In other words the fact that an employee belongs to the group of individuals (31%) who experienced the highest 
increase in earnings between 1999 and 2000 does not have any influence on the fact that he declares that he took 
the initiative of the training. 
21 Various theoretical models have been proposed to understand the rationality of such a decision taken by the 
employer (see, Dupray and Hanchane, 1999, for a review of this literature). 
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4 The Impact of Training on Earnings Dispersion 
 
4.1 Estimating the Contribution of the Explanatory Variables to the Overall Variance: 
 
To estimate these contributions we use a recent contribution of Fields (forthcoming). 
Let us first write the earnings function as 
yk  = S k=1 to (K+3)  bk zkj                                                                            (1) 
where  
yj  is the logarithm of the wage of individual j, 
zkj = xkj "k=1 to K, where xkj refers to the value taken by the explanatory variable k for individual 
j. Note that these K variables do not include that referring to the participation (Fj) in the training 
program and the impact of the selectivity bias (lj). We therefore have also 
zK+1,j = Fj,  zK+2,j = lj and finally zK+3,j = uj where is the value taken by the disturbance uj for 
individual j. Note also that we will assume below that 
bK+1 = c, bK+2 = d, bK+3 = 1  
 
Following Fields(forthcoming) it can be shown (see, section II in the methodological Appendix) 
that the relative contribution of factor k to the variance V(yj ) may be expressed as 
sk (yj ) = [(bk ) Cov (zkj , yj )] / V(yj )                                                           (2) 
where V(yj ) denotes the variance of the logarithms of wages yj .                                                                                          
As a consequence the relative contribution of factor xh (h=1 to k) to this variance is equal to  
sh (yj ) = [(bh ) Cov (zhj , yj )] / V(yj )                                                          (3) 
Similarly the relative contribution of the participation to an « on-the-job » training program may 
be expressed as 
sF (yj ) = [(c) Cov (Fj , yj )] / V(yj )                                                             (4) 
while that of the Mills ratio will be written as 
sl (yj ) = [(d) Cov (lj , yj )] / V(yj )                                                             (5) 
Finally the relative contribution of unobserved variables (the disturbance uj ) is equal to 
su (yj ) = Cov (e j, yj ) / V(yj )                                                                     (6) 
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While expressions (3) to (6) give the contribution of the various explanatory factors and of the 
disturbance to the overall variance of the (logarithms of) wages, it is also possible to compute the 
contribution of these elements to the between and within groups variance.  
 
4.2 Separating the Between and Within Groups Effects 
 
4.2.1 Contribution of the Explanatory Variables to the Within-Groups Variance 
Introducing the Mills ratio (see, the methodological Appendix and in particular equation (A-6) we 
may rewrite (1) separately for an individual belonging to group A and one belonging to group B. 
In the first case we write 
yjA  = S k=1 to K  bk xkjA  + rse [(- f j )/(1- F j )] + wjA                                                (7) 
Since [(- f j )/(1- F j )] is the expression for Mill’s ratio in group A and rse that for the coefficient 
d (see, Green, 2000). 
For group B expression (1) will be written as 
yjB  = S k=1 to K  bk xkjB  + c + rse [ f j / F j ] + wjB                                                     (8) 
since [ f j / F j ] is the expression for Mill’s ratio in group B. 
Contribution to the within groups variance: 
Since the within groups variance is equal to the weighted sum of the variance within each of the 
two groups A and B (see, section III of the methodological Appendix) we ma write that 
VWITH = f VA (yj) + (1-f) VB (yj)                                                                            (9) 
Combining (2) and (9) we derive that the contribution sk,WITH(yj ) of each of the (K+2) factors22 to 
the within groups variance may be written as 
sk,WITH(yj)={(1-f)[(bk)Cov(zkj,jÎB, yj, jÎB)/VB(yj)]+(f)[(bk)Cov(zkj, jÎA, yj, jÎA)/ VA(yj)]           (10) 
One may however further expand (1) by assuming that the disturbance uj  (jÎB) of those who 
received on-the-job training is itself a function of G variables such as the mode of financing, the 
training, the side who took the initiative of the training, etc… 
In other words one would estimate a new regression that would be written as 
wj = åg=1 to G eg rg,j + n j  for jÎB                                                                                           (11) 
so that the variance V(wj,jÎB ) of the disturbance wj,jÎB may be written as 
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V(wj,jÎB )= S g=1 to G+1 [(eg ) Cov (rg,j jÎB , wj jÎB ) ]                                              (12) 
where the (G+1)th factor refers to the new disturbance n j (eg+1 is evidently equal to 1). 
We may therefore write that the contribution sg(yj, jÎT ) of these additional (G+1) factors to the 
within group B variance VB(yj ) will be expressed as 
sg(yj, jÎT) = [(eg ) Cov (rg,j, jÎB , yj, jÎB )/ V(wj, jÎB)] ´ [(V(wj, jÎB)/VB(yj)]                          
sg(yj, jÎT ) = [(eg ) Cov (rg,j, jÎB , yj, jÎB )/ VB(yj)]                                                                (13) 
4.2.2 Contribution of the Explanatory Variables to the Between-Groups Variance 
 
The group means 
Let ymA, ymB and ym be the means of the variable yj  in group A, group B and the whole population 
respectively. Using (7) and (8) the mean values ymA and ymB of the logarithms of wages in groups 
A and B may be expressed as 
 ymA  = S k=1 to K  bk xkmA  + rse [((- f j )/(1- F j ))m] + wmA                                      (14) 
and 
ymB  = S k=1 to K  bk xkmB  + c + rse [ (f j / F j )m] + wmB                                            (15) 
where xkmA, xkmB,  wmA, wmB, ((- f j )/(1- F j ))m and (f j / F j )m are respectively the mean values of 
characteristic k, the disturbance uj and Mill’s ratios in groups A and B.    
The overall mean ym  will then be expressed as 
ym= S k=1 to K bk (f xkmA + (1-f) xkmB) + (1-f) c + rse [f ((- f j )/(1- F j ))m + (1-f) (f j / F j )m]    (16) 
since by definition f wmA + (1-f) wmB = 0.                 
Contributions to the between groups variance : 
To compute the between-groups variance VBET(yj ) of the (logarithms of) earnings one has 
evidently to neutralize the within groups dispersion and thus to assume that every worker who 
received on-the-job training receives the mean (logarithm of) earnings yM,B of those who received 
such training while those who did not receive any on-the-job are assumed to receive the mean 
earnings yM,A of those who did not receive any training, where yM,A and yM,B are given in 
expressions (14) and (15). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
22  Here evidently there is no contribution of factor F to the within groups variance. 
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The contribution sk,B(yj ) of each of the (K+3) factors to the between groups variance, using again 
Fields’ (forthcoming) approach, will then be expressed as 
sk,BET(yj ) = [(bk ) Cov (zkM , yM )] / VBET(yj )                                                   (17) 
For example to determine the contribution of a given characteristic xk to the between groups 
variance of the logarithms of wages we have to compute, as shown in (17), the covariance 
Cov (xkM , yM ). The latter may be written as 
Cov (zkM , yM ) = (1/N) {[åiÎA (xkMA – (f xkMA + (1-f) xkMB))( yMA – yM)] 
                         + [åiÎB (xkMB – (f xkMA + (1-f) xkMB))( yMB – yM)]}             (18) 
where xkMA and xkMB are the mean values of xk in groups A and B. 
It is easy to show that, after some simplifications, one ends up with 
Cov (zkM , yM ) = f (1-f) (xkMB –  xkMA) ( yMB – yMA)                                    (19)   
Since the between groups variance may be expressed (see, section III of the methodological 
Appendix) as 
VBET = f (1- f)(ymA - ymB)2                                                                                                                              (20) 
we can combine (17), (19) and (20) to derive that   
sk,BET(yj) = [(bk) (xkMB – xkMA)] / ( yMB – yMA)                                            (21) 
For the contribution of the variable Fj to the between groups dispersion, one will obtain similarly, 
remembering that in this case xkMB = 1 and  xkMA= 0, 
sF,BET(yj) = [c / ( yMB – yMA) ]                                                                     (22) 
The contribution of the ratio of Mill lj to the between groups dispersion will be expressed, using 
(7) and (8), as 
sl,BET(yj) = (rse)[(f j / F j )m - ((- f j )/(1- F j ))m] / ( yMB – yMA)                   (23)                                     
Finally the contribution of the disturbances to the between groups dispersion will be written as 
su,BET(yj) = [(wMB – wMA)] / ( yMB – yMA)                                                    (24) 
where uMB and uMA are respectively the mean values of the disturbances in groups B and A. 
Combining expressions (21) to (24) it is easy to show that the sum of all the contributions to the 
between groups dispersion is equal to 1 since 
åk=1 to K  bk (xkMB – xkMA)] + c + (rse)[(f j / F j )m - ((- f j )/(1- F j ))m] + (wMB – wMA) 
 15 
= {[åk=1 to K  bk xkMB] + c + (rse)[(rse)[(f j / F j )m] + wMB}  
– {[åk=1 to K  bk xkMA] + (rse)[((- f j )/(1- F j ))m] + wMA} 
= ( yMB – yMA)           
4.2.3 Summary : 
We may therefore conclude, using all the previous results, that  
1) the contribution of a given factor k (k = 1 to K) to the total variance VTOT of the logarithms of 
wages is the sum of three elements: 
- its impact via its contribution to the within group A variance VA (see, (10)); this effect will be 
expressed as 
{[(bk)Cov(zkj, jÎA,yj, jÎA)/ VA(yj)]}{(f)VA(yj)/VWITH(yj)} {VWITH(yj)/VTOT(yj)} = 
                               {(f)[(bk)Cov(zkj, jÎA, yj, jÎA)]/VTOT(yj)}                                  (25) 
- its impact via its contribution to the within group B variance VB, (see again (10)); this effect will 
be expressed as 
{[(bk)Cov(zkj, jÎB,yj, jÎB)/VB(yj)]}{(1-f)VB(yj)/VWITH(yj)} {VWITH(yj)/VTOT(yj)} = 
                              {(1-f)[(bk)Cov(zkj, jÎB, yj, jÎB)]/VTOT(yj)}                                    (26) 
- its impact via the between groups variance VBET (see, (21)); this effect will be expressed as 
{[(bk) Cov(zkM , yM )] /VBET(yj )}VBET(yj)/VTOT(yj)} = {[(bk ) Cov (zkM , yM )] / VTOT(yj )}   (27) 
Combining (25), (26) and (27) we end up with a total impact of the variable k expressed as 
{[(f)(bk)Cov(zkj,jÎA,yj,jÎA)]+[(1-f)(bk)Cov(zkj,jÎB,yj,jÎB)]+[(bk) Cov (zkM , yM )]}/VTOT(yj)    (28) 
 
2) the contribution of the variable on-the-job training Fj which, evidently, will have an impact 
only via its contribution to the between groups variance VBET (see, (22)); this effect will be 
expressed as 
{[(c) Cov (Fj , yM )] / VBET(yj )}{VBET(yj)/VTOT(yj)} = {[(c ) Cov (Fj , yM )] / VTOT(yj )}   (29) 
where Fj as before, will be equal to 0 for group A and to 1 for group B, while yM will be equal to 
yMA gor group A and to yMB for group B. 
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3) The contribution of Mills’ ratio will be the sum of three elements: 
- its impact via its contribution to the within group A variance VA (see, (10)). This effect will be 
expressed as 
{[(d)Cov(lj, jÎA,yj, jÎA)/ VA(yj)]}{(f)VA(yj)/VWITH(yj)} {VWITH(yj)/VTOT(yj)} = 
                               {(f)[(d)Cov((lj, jÎA, yj, jÎA)]/VTOT(yj)}                                  (30) 
- its impact via its contribution to the within group B variance VB, (see again (10)). This effect will 
be expressed as 
{[(d)Cov(lj, jÎB,yj, jÎB)/ VB(yj)]}{(1-f)VB(yj)/VWITH(yj)} {VWITH(yj)/VTOT(yj)} = 
                               {(1-f)[(d)Cov((lj, jÎB, yj, jÎB)]/VTOT(yj)}                                  (31) 
- its impact via the between groups variance VBET (see, (23)). This effect will be expressed as 
{(rse)[(f j / F j )m - ((- f j )/(1- F j ))m] / VBET(yj)}{VBET(yj)/VTOT(yj)} =  
{(rse)[(f j / F j )m - ((- f j )/(1- F j ))m]} / VTOT(yj)}                                                  (32) 
Combining (30), (31) and (32) we end up with a total impact of Mills’ ratio expressed as 
{[f (d) Cov((lj, jÎA, yj, jÎA)] + [(1-f) (d) Cov((lj, jÎB, yj, j(B)]  
+ [(rs()((f j / F j )m - ((- f j )/(1- F j ))m)]} /VTOT(yj)}                                                (33) 
 
4) The contribution of the disturbances will also be the sum of three elements: 
- their impact via their contribution to the within group A variance VA (see, (10)). This effect will 
be expressed as 
{[Cov(wj, j(A,yj, j(A)/ VA(yj)]}{(f)VA(yj)/VWITH(yj)} {VWITH(yj)/VTOT(yj)} = 
                               {(f)[Cov(wj, j(A, yj, j(A)]/VTOT(yj)}                                          (34) 
- their impact via their contribution to the within group B variance VB, (see again (10)). This 
effect will be expressed as 
{[Cov(wj, j(B,yj, j(B)/VB(yj)]}{(1-f)VB(yj)/VWITH(yj)} {VWITH(yj)/VTOT(yj)} = 
                              {(1-f)[Cov(wj, j(B, yj, j(B)]/VTOT(yj)}                                         (34) 
- their impact via the between groups variance VBET (see, (24)); this effect will be expressed as 
{[ Cov (wM , yM )] / VBET(yj )}{VBET(yj)/VTOT(yj)} = {[ Cov (wM , yM )] / VTOT(yj )}   (35) 
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where wM = wMA  if individual j belongs to group A and wM = wMB  if individual j belongs to group 
B. Similarly yM = yMA  if individual j belongs to group A and yM = yMB  if individual j belongs to 
group B. 
The overall effect of the disturbances may hence be expressed as 
{(f)[Cov(wj, jÎA, yj, jÎA)]} + {(1-f)[Cov(wj, jÎB, yj, jÎB)]} + {[ Cov (wM , yM )]} /VTOT(yj)}  (36) 
 
5) Finally the effect of the additional variables rgj introduced in (11) will be expressed, using (34), 
as 
{[(eg ) Cov (rg,j, jÎB , yj, jÎB )/ VB(yj)]}{(1-f) VB(yj)/ VWITH(yj)}{VWITH(yj)/VTOT(yj)]} = 
{(1-f)[(eg ) Cov (rg,j, jÎB , yj, jÎB )]/ VTOT(yj)}                                               (37) 
4.3 The Empirical Results 
 
Table 6 gives the decomposition of the total variance of the logarithm of wages into two 
components, the between groups (the groups being those who received training and those who 
did not) and the within groups variance. It appears that most of the dispersion (94.5% of the 
variance) takes place within groups while the between groups variance represents only 5.5% of 
the total variance. 
Tables 7 and 8 give the contribution of the different explanatory variables to the between and 
within groups variances respectively. These two tables should be interpreted differently. 
 
Contributions of the various variables to the within groups variance 
 
To analyze the results we have to remember the formulations given in equation (A-18) in the 
Appendix on the basis of equation (2) where the contribution of a given variable k (in 
percentage) to the variance of the regression is shown to be a function the coefficient bk of this 
variable in the regression (earnings function), its correlation Cor (zkj ,  yj ) with the dependent 
variable (the logarithm of earnings) and its dispersion, relative to the dispersion of the dependent 
variable s(zkj ) / s(yj ). Such a general interpretation evidently holds also in the case of the within 
groups variance. 
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The results in table 8 are given separately for those who received (group B) and those who did 
not receive (group A) any training. Table 8 indicates that the three variables that contribute most 
to the dispersion of (the logarithms of) earnings in group A are respectively the dichotomous 
variables “works full-time” (explains 27.7% of the variance of the logarithm of earnings) and 
“works part time, 0 to 15 hours” (explains 9.48% of the variance of the logarithms of earnings) 
and the residuals (36.72% of the variance of the logarithms of earnings). Since the dependent 
variable represents the monthly earnings, because we had no way of estimating the hourly wages, 
the role played by the number of hours of work is not surprising. Once this factor is taken into 
account, it thus appears that approximately half of the remaining variance is explained by the 
unobserved heterogeneity of the individuals.   
The two other variables that have a somehow significant contribution to the variance of the 
(logarithms of) earnings in group A are the dichotomous variables “holds a CEP” and 
“employee”. Note that although their coefficients in the regression are relatively similar (-0.27 
and –0.22), the simple correlation (see, Table 11) with the dependent variable is higher in 
absolute value for “Employees” (-0.39) than for “Holds a CEP” (-0.17). in addition the standard 
deviation of the variable “Employees” is higher (0.470) than that of the variable “Holds a CEP” 
(0.364, see Table 1). This is why in group A the variable “Employees” has a greater contribution 
to the variance of earnings than the variable “Holds a CEP”. 
In group B (those individuals that received training) the two most important contributions to the 
variance of earnings are again those of the residuals and of the variable “worked full time”. The 
explanation is similar to that given earlier for group A and will not be repeated here. These two 
variables have a however a smaller contribution (in percentage) because for the group of 
individuals who received training other variables play a role. Firstly note the important 
contribution of the dummy variable “Engineer or Managerial Position” (14.5%). This variable has 
a high coefficient in the regression since Engineers and those having a managerial position earn, 
ceteris paribus, 35.6% more than technicians, the occupational group that serves as reference. 
Moreover this variable ”Engineers or Managerial Position”  is highly correlated with (the 
logarithm of ) earnings (correlation coefficient equal to 0.55) and its standard deviation (0.385, 
see Table 1) is also quite high. The other variable whose contribution should be mentioned is 
Mill’s ratio but we will discuss it below in a separate section. Let us now turn to an analysis of the 
contribution of the different variables to the between groups variance. 
 
Contributions of the various variables to the between groups variance 
 19 
 
Equation (21) indicates that the contribution of a given variable to the between groups variance is 
positively related to the coefficient of this variable in the regression and to the difference between 
the two groups in the means of this variable and negatively related to the difference between the 
two groups in the means of the dependent variable (logarithms of earnings). Four of the five 
variables that have an important impact on this between groups variance were already mentioned 
when we analyzed the determinants of the within groups variance. These variables are by 
decreasing order of importance (in their contribution to the between groups variance) as follows: 
“Holds a CEP” (17%), “Works Full Time” (15%), “Is an Engineer or Has a Managerial Position” 
(13%), “Is a Specialized Worker” (6.1%) and finally “Works less than 15 hours per week” (5.1%). 
The impact of Mills ratio and of the variable “received vocational training” will be discussed 
below in a separate section. 
Equation (21) may also be used to derive some additional intuitive interpretation of the results. 
Let us rewrite (21) as ( yMB – yMA) / (xkMB – xkMA) = (bk) / sk,BET(yj)                                              
Since the variables yMB and yMA are logarithms, their difference may be interpreted as the 
percentage difference in the average earnings of the two groups. Moreover for all the dummy 
variables, the expression (xkMB – xkMA) refers in fact to the difference between the percentage of 
individuals in group A who have characteristic k (e.g. are “Employees”) and the corresponding 
percentage in group B. The ratio [(bk) / sk,BET(yj)] is therefore in this case a kind of elasticity and 
tells us by how much the percentage difference between the average earnings in the two groups 
will increase (in absolute, not relative terms) when the gap between the percentages of individuals 
who have characteristic k in the two groups increases by 1% (here also in absolute, not relative 
terms). Let us see what this implies for the five variables mentioned previously by looking at the 
data of Table 1, 3 and 7. Table 1 indicates for example that 34.5% of those who did not receive 
training had a “CEP” while the corresponding percentage among those who received training is 
15.8%. The difference between these two percentages is hence equal to 18.7%. Remembering 
that the difference between the average values of the logarithms of earnings in the two groups is 
equal to –0.296, we derive that the ratio [(bk)  / sk,BET(yj)] for this variable is equal to (-
0.296/0.187) = -1.58. In other words assume that this gap between the two groups in the 
percentage of those having a “CEP” decreases by 1%, from 18.7% to 17.7%.  This then implies 
that the average gap in earnings between the two groups will decrease by 1.6%, from 29.6% to 
28%. 
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Using the same kind of computations, one can find out that, ceteris paribus, the average gap in 
earnings between the two groups will increase by 2.7% if the percentage difference between the 
two groups in the number of individuals who are engineers or have a managerial position 
increases by 1%. Similarly it will increase by 4.7% if the percentage difference between the two 
groups in the number of individuals who work full time increases by 1% but will decrease by 
2.7% if the percentage difference between the two groups in the number of individuals who are 
specialized workers increases by 1%. On the contrary it will decrease by 16.2% if the percentage 
difference between the two groups in the number of individuals who work less than 15 hours 
increases by 1%. Note that the strong reaction (16.2%) that was just mentioned is due to the fact 
that, as indicated in Table 1, the actual gap between the two groups in the percentage of those 
working less than 15 hours is rather small since it is equal to 0.5 – 2.3 = -1.8%. 
The contributions of the Mills ratio and of the variable “Received Vocational Training” to the variance of earnings  
Let us fist look at the contribution of Mills’ ratio to the within groups variance of earnings. It 
appears (see, Table 8) that 3% of the variance of earnings among those who did not receive any 
training (group A) is due to differences among the individuals in the value taken by the Mills 
ratio, that is to that part of the unobserved heterogeneity that has an impact on the a  priori 
probability to receive such a training. Among those who did in fact receive such a vocational 
training, the contribution of Mills ratio to the variance of earnings is even equal to 8%. 
As far as the between groups variance of earnings is concerned, we have to take into account the 
contributions of the dummy variable “Received Vocational Training” a well as that of the Ratio 
of Mills. The combined contribution of these two variables to the between groups variance of 
earnings may be considered as the net contribution of training to the between groups variance of 
earnings. Such a contribution takes into account not only the impact of training on earnings but 
also that of the unobserved heterogeneity that has an effect on the probability of receiving 
training. It thus appears that 35% (170 – 135) of the between groups variance of earnings is due 
to this combined effect. Note that the sign of the contribution of the Mills ratio is negative. This 
implies that the pure effect of vocational training on the between groups dispersion of earnings 
would have been stronger, had there be no impact of the unobserved variables on the probability 
of receiving training.  
To better understand the significance of contributions that are greater than 100% we have to go 
back to the interpretation in terms of elasticities that has been given previously in the case of 
between groups dispersion. The value of 170% which is the contribution of the variable 
“Received Vocational Training” to the between groups variance of earnings should therefore be 
 21 
understood as follows. Assume we divide the population of workers in two groups and observe 
the percentage difference in the average earnings in these two groups. Decide then to give to one 
of these two groups only (group B) vocational training. If the difference in size between the 
group who received training and that who did not increases in absolute value by one percent (e.g. 
if group B, that receives training is equal to 29.26% of the workers rather than 28.26% so that 
group A will represent 70.74% rather than 71.74% of the workers) and if the unobserved 
heterogeneity is assumed not to have any impact on the probability to receive training, then the 
gap between the average earnings in both groups would, ceteris paribus, be equal to 170% of its 
present value.   
The story in reality is however very different. The allocation of workers to training is not random. 
On the contrary the unobserved heterogeneity has an impact on the probability to receive 
training as well as on the earnings themselves. We have therefore to neutralize this effect of the 
unobserved heterogeneity before we can say anything on the net impact of training of wages. 
This is why we have to conclude (see, Table 7) that the net (of the effect of the unobserved 
heterogeneity on the probability of receiving training) contribution of earnings to the between 
groups variance is only equal to 35%. Using again our interpretation in terms of elasticities, the 
interpretation of the results should now be as follows. Assume we divide the population of 
workers in two groups, observe the percentage difference in the average earnings in these two 
groups and decide to give to one of these two groups only (group B) vocational training. If then 
the difference in size between the group who received training and that who did not, increases in 
absolute value by one percent, we will find out, once we take into account the impact of the 
unobserved heterogeneity on the probability to receive training (that is, on the way the 
individuals were allocated to the two groups) that the gap between the average earnings in both 
groups will, ceteris paribus, be equal to 35% of its present value (remember that the other 
variables explain 65% of the present gap).  
 
5 Conclusions 
 
This paper is a first attempt to devise a methodology that allows estimating the exact impact of 
training on the dispersion of wages. It uses an approach originally proposed by Fields 
(forthcoming) but extends it to the breakdown of inequality by population subgroups as well as 
to the case where the earnings function that is at the base of the analysis has to be adjusted for 
selectivity bias. The empirical illustration is based on a survey conducted in France at the end of 
the twentieth century.  
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The results of the analysis show first that when a distinction is made between workers who 
received training and those who did not, the between groups dispersion explains only 5.5% of the 
overall variance of earnings. We also found that more than one third of this between groups 
variance was explained by the combined effect of the unobserved heterogeneity and the 
distinction between those who received and did not receive on-the-job training. We also noted 
that the unobserved heterogeneity led to a drastic reduction of the impact of training on earnings, 
since those who received training were also those who had a priori the highest probability of 
receiving training. 
Most of the earnings dispersion however turned out to be a within groups dispersion and more 
than two thirds of this within groups variance of the logarithms of earnings could be explained by 
the variables that were taken into account. Ignoring the contribution of the number of hours of 
work23 that really played the role of a control variable since we did not have any information on 
the hourly wages, we may observe that, for those who did not receive any training, the main 
(other) factors of this dispersion are the level of education (contribution of 6.5%) and the type of 
occupation (contribution of 15.5%). For those who received training the following variables (in 
addition to the number of hours of work) played an important role: the type of occupation 
(contribution of 24%), the level of education (8.5%) and the unobserved heterogeneity (the Mills 
ratio has a contribution of 8.2%).  
It should therefore be clear, given that there is a small between groups and a big within groups 
dispersion, that there is a lot of overlapping between the distributions of earnings of the two 
groups, those who received and those who did not receive training. Such findings imply that even 
though the unobserved heterogeneity plays a key role in the selection of those who receive 
training and thus indirectly has an impact on the difference between the average earnings of those 
who receive and do not receive training, it cannot be considered as a variable that could lie 
behind market segmentation. This is so because the within groups variance is much higher than 
that of the between groups so that the distribution of earnings of these two groups show a great 
degree of overlapping. In other words there is a much greater degree of heterogeneity within than 
between the two groups corresponding to those who received and did not receive on-the-job 
training. As a consequence if labor market segmentation exists, it must be based on other criteria.  
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Methodological Appendix 
 
I) The Empirical Specification of the Earnings Function 
 
The problem here is to be able to identify separately the impact on earnings of the selectivity bias 
on one hand and the effect of vocational training on the other hand. The identification of the 
impact on earnings of a policy aiming for example at easing the professional insertion of youth in 
the labor force or at providing continued vocational training can be based on OLS only if the 
individuals participating in such programs have been randomly selected. In other words one 
would estimate an earnings function of the type  
 
Y = Xb + cF + e                  (A-1) 
 
where Y is the logarithm of monthly earnings, X is a matrix of explanatory variables, F a dummy 
variable indicating whether the individual participated (F=1) or not (F=0) in the training program 
and u is a random variable of mean 0 and standard deviation su . 
However when the participation to the training program is subject to prior selection, equation 
(A-1) above cannot be estimated by OLS because the parameter c would be influenced by both 
the selectivity bias and the structural effect linked to the participation in the training program. 
 
Let us therefore express the conditional expectation of earnings as 
 
E(Y/X,F) = Xb + cF + E(e/X,F)               (A-2) 
 
We need therefore to estimate the expectation of the residual u. But the distribution of these  
residuals is truncated by the values of F which cannot be considered as exogenous. We need 
therefore in a first step to specify the determinants of F and use a Probit model written as 
 
F* = Zg + v         (A-3) 
 
with F=1 if F*>0 and F=0 otherwise. 
 
In other words we calculate 
 
Prob{F=1} = F( Zg)     (A-4) 
 
and 
 
Prob{F=0} = 1 - F( Zg)        (A-5) 
 
where F(.) refers to the distribution function of the normal law. 
 
If we assume that the joint distribution (v, e) is a bivariate normal distribution expressed as  
N(0, 0, 1, se , r), it is easy to determine the Residual of equation (2) on the basis of the properties 
of a truncated bivariate normal distribution (see, Greene, 2000). 
 
Finally it is possible to separately identify the impact of the selectivity bias and that of the 
participation (F) in the training program by estimating the following OLS regression (see, Barnow 
et al., 1980): 
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Y = Xb + cF + (F´ rl ) + ((1-F) ´ r l* ) + w                                (A-6) 
 
where  
 
l = f ( Zg)/F( Zg)                                                                                 (A-7) 
 
and 
 
l* = -f ( Zg)/[1-F( Zg)]                                                                        (A-8) 
 
f being the normal density function while l and l* are Mill’s ratios when F=1 and F=0 
respectively. Finally w is the residual of the regression. 
 
Correcting the variance-covariance matrix for heteroskedasticity (because of the presence of an 
estimated variable l and of the sensitivity of the residuals to the selectivity bias) is a standard 
procedure (see, Heckman, 1979). One should just remember in the estimation procedure that the 
ratios of Mills are not the same when F=1 and F=0. 
 
II) The contribution of the explanatory variables to the variance of earnings: Fields’ 
(forthcoming) approach. 
 
Using (1) we may write that 
Var (yj ) = Cov[ S k=1 to (K+3)  bk zkj , yj ]                                                     (A-9) 
Dividing both sides of (A-9) by Var (yj ), we then derive that 
1 = Cov[ S k=1 to (K+3)  bk zkj , yj ]/ Var (yj )                                                                  (A-10) 
It is however well-known (see, Mood, Graybill and Boes, 1974) that 
Cov [å k=1 to (K+3)  bk zkj , yj ] = S k=1 to (K+3) Cov[ bk zkj , yj ]                                       (A-11) 
Expression (A-10) may therefore be expressed as 
1 = S k=1 to (K+3) Cov[ bk zkj , yj ] ]/ Var (yj )                                                               (A-13) 
since Cov[ S k=1 to (K+3)  bk zkj , yj ] = S k=1 to (K+3) Cov[ bk zkj , yj ] = Var (yj ) 
If we also remember that the correlation coefficient between bk zkj and yj may be expressed as 
Cor [bk zkj , yj ] = Cov [bk zkj , yj ]/ ((s(bk zkj ), (s(yj ))                                          (A-14) 
we end up, combining expressions (A-11) to (A-14), with 
1 = S k=1 to (K+3) [Cor (bk zkj , yj ) (s(bk zkj ))/ (s(yj ))]                                            (A-15) 
However since 
Cor (bk zkj , yj ) = Cor (zkj , yj )                                                                               (A-16) 
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expression (A-15) implies that 
s(yj )= S k=1 to (K+3) [(bk ) Cor (zkj , yj ) (s(zkj ))]                                                    (A-17) 
The relative contribution sk (yj ) of factor k to the dispersion s(yj ) may therefore ce expressed as 
sk (yj ) = [(bk ) Cor (zkj , yj ) (s(zkj ))] / S k=1 to (K+3) [(bk ) Cor (zkj , yj ) (s(zkj ))] 
Û sk (yj ) = [(bk ) Cor (zkj , yj ) (s(zkj ))] / s(yj )                                                  (A-18) 
Using (A-14) expression (A-18) may be also expressed, after simplifying, as 
sk (yj ) = [(bk ) Cov (zkj , yj )] / V(yj )                                                                   (A-19) 
where V(yj ) denotes the variance of the logarithms of wages yj .                                                                                          
III) Decomposing the overall variance into between and within groups variances: 
Let us divide the population into two groups of individuals, those who did not receive on-the-job 
training (group A) and those who had on-the-job training (group B). Let f and (1-f) be the 
respective shares of groups A and B in the total population.  
The overall variance VTOT of the logarithms of wages in the whole population will then be written 
as 
VTOT = (1/N) [ åjÎA (yjA - ym)2 + åjÎB (yjB - ym)2 ]                                                         (A-20)    
where N is the size of the whole population. 
Calling NA and NB the number of individuals in groups A and B, so that f = (NA/N) and  
(1-f) = (NB/N), expression (A-1) may also be written as 
VTOT={(NA/N)[(1/NA)åjÎA((yjA-ymA)+(ymA-ym))2]}+{(NB/N)[(1/NB)åjÎB((yjB-ymB)+(ymB-ym))2]} 
ÛVTOT=f [(1/NA)åjÎA((yjA-ymA)2] + f (ymA-ym)2 + (1-f)[(1/NB)åjÎB((yjB-ymB)2] + (1-f)(ymB-ym)2  
VTOT = f VA (yj) + (1-f) VB (yj) + f (ymA-ym)2 + (1-f)(ymB-ym)2                                                   (A-21) 
It is then easy to show that (A-21) indicates in fact that the overall variance VTOT is equal to the 
sum of the within and between groups variances.  
The within groups variance: 
It is well-known that the within groups variance VWITH is equal to the population weighted sum of 
the variance within each group: 
VWITH = f [(1/NA)åjÎA((yjA-ymA)2] + (1-f)[(1/NB)åjÎB((yjB-ymB)2]  
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VWITH = f VA (yj) + (1-f) VB (yj)                                                                            (A-22) 
where VA (yj) and VB (yj) refer to the variance of the logarithms of wages in groups A and B. 
The between groups variance: 
Let us call it VBET. It may be expressed as 
VBET = f (ymA - ym)2 + (1- f) (ymB - ym)2                                                                  (A-23) 
Û VBET =  f (ymA)2 + (1-f) (ymB)2  - (f ymA + (1- f) ymB )2                                     (A-24)   
since ym = f ymA + (1- f) ymB                                                                    
Expression (A-24) may then be easily simplified to derive finally that 
VBET = f (1- f)(ymA - ymB)2                                                                                                                              (A-25) 
It should then be clear that the sum of VBET in (A-25) and VWITH in (A-22) is equal to the overall 
variance VTOT in (A-21) so that 
VTOT = = VWITH + VBET                                                                                             (A-26) 
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Table 1: Mean Values of Variables 
 
 
Variable Group of Individuals who 
Received Training 
Group of Individuals who did 
not Receive any Training 
Higher Education Diploma 0.119058 0.0448869 
Holder of “Baccalauréat” 0.174304 0.110699 
Holds a CAP or BEP 0.324197 0.360445 
Holds a BEPC 0.0582441 0.0642929 
Holds a CEP 0.157602 0.345427 
“Specialized” Worker 0.0475375 0.155586 
“Qualified”Worker 0.192291 0.289571 
Engineer or Managerial 
Position 
0.180728 0.0713804 
Employee 0.329764 0.358927 
Other Professions 0.0479657 0.0308809 
Has a Work Contract of 
Undetermined Duration 
0.946467 0.925582 
Other Categories of Trainees 0.0265525 0.0323996 
Seniority in Firm 11.8745 11.4096 
Square of Seniority in firm 232.455 222.653 
Age 39.785 41.2762 
Square of Age 1663.33 1798.48 
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Works Full-time (40 hours at 
least) 
0.886081 0.82349 
Works Part-time (30 to 40 
hours) 
0.0432548 0.0477557 
Works Part-time (less than  15  
hours) 
0.00513919 0.023456 
Has the Same Work Schedule 
Every Day 
0.592291 0.645461 
Has a Variable Work Schedule 0.256531 0.217179 
Logarithm of Monthly Wage 9.1468 8.8506 
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Table 2: Results of the Probit Analysis 
Dependent Variable: Probability to Receive Vocational Training 
 
 
Explanatory variable Coefficient T-values 
Constant -0.582913 -5.018 
Female -0.066122 -15.673 
French 0.318499 -12.612 
« Specialized » Worker -1.05278 -1.739 
«Qualified» Worker -0.639545 4.373 
Engineer or managerial 
position 
0.131243 2.225 
Employee -0.389227 -7.453 
Other Professions -0.080194 -0.923 
Has a Work Contract of 
Undetermined Duration 
0.150849 1.773 
Other Categories of trainees 0.220701 1.801 
Firm’s Size : 0-3 -0.294301 -4/052 
                       3-9 -0/295934 -6.093 
                     10-49 -0/21176 -4.621 
                     49-100 -0.0105794 -0.170 
        More than 500 0.327546 7.899 
 
Note: -log V = 4496; c2(14)=844.1866 ; N=8261 
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Table 3: Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Monthly Earnings 
 
 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient T-values 
Constant 7.79499 104.191 
Higher Education Diploma 0.141637 7.54541 
Holder of “Baccalauréat” -0.0610305 -3.95364 
Holds a CAP or BEP -0.148738 -10.4908 
Holds a BEPC -0.172615 -9.03481 
Holds a CEP -0.268688 -17.5295 
“Specialized” Worker  -0/167361 -6.57283 
“Qualified”Worker -0.0823735 -4.11363 
Engineer or Managerial 
Position 
0.355713 18/4884 
Employee -0.217003 -12.5544 
Other Professions -00496812 -1.90557 
Has a Work Contract of 
Undetermined Duration 
-0.00137579 -1.9821 
Other Categories of Trainees 0.00977079 -0.041973 
Seniority in Firm 0.00977079 6.88255 
Square of Seniority in firm -0.000111141 -2.64295 
Age 0.0219171 6.51289 
Square of Age -0.000210687 -5.20881 
 34 
Works Full Time (40 hours at 
least) 
0.708941 52.7373 
Works Part Time (30 to 40 
Hours) 
0.400116 19.1893 
Works Part Time (less than  15  
Hours) 
-0.820346 -26.8967 
Has the Same Work Schedule 
Every Day 
-0.0417639 -3.70048 
Has a Variable Work Schedule -0.0310386 -2.3757 
Received Vocational Training 0.503431 9.53992 
Mill’s Ratio -0.263616 -8.38388 
R-Square 0.659  
Adjusted R-Square 0.658  
F-Value for Regression 693.1  
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Table 4: Regression results 
Dependent Variable: Residual of Regression of Table 2 
 
 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Coefficient of 
Regression 
T-Values 
Constant -0/0799758 -2.17485 
Training originated 
in individual 
initiative* 
0.107008 2.73129 
Training originated 
in initiative from 
firm* 
0.0965566 2.58234 
Training originated 
in initiative from 
both the individual 
and the firm* 
0.099925 2.60159 
The individual 
financed the 
training** 
-0.104276 -2.39751 
Other type of 
Financing** 
-0.133894 -5.61997 
 
*   The reference category is “Other sources of initiative” 
** The reference category is « Financing by the firm » 
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Table 5: Characteristics of the training financed by the employer  
as a function of the side that took the initiative of the training24 
 
SIDE TAKING THE 
INITIATIVE OF 
THE TRAINING 
TRAINING TAKEN 
AT THE 
INITIATIVE OF  
THE EMPLOYER 
TRAINING TAKEN 
AT THE 
INITIATIVE OF 
BOTH THE 
EMPLOYER AND 
THE EMPLOYEE 
TRAINING TAKEN 
AT THE 
INITITATIVE OF 
THE EMPLOYEE 
FIELD OF 
TRAINING 
   
Trade, sales, 
marketing 
11.8 10.8 7.1 
Industrial techniques 20.4 19.9 16.4 
Hygiene and security 14.5 7.3 5.5 
Secretarial tasks, 
office management, 
computer skills 
25.5 31.4 27.7 
Other categories 27.8 30.6 43.3 
TYPE OF 
TRAINING 
   
Practical training, 
course, seminar 
63.1 92.6 88.7 
On-the job training 34.6 2 4 
Other categories 2.3 5.4 7.2 
                                                                 
24  For each characteristic, the sum of each column is equal to 100%. 
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GOAL OF 
TRAINING 
   
Getting adjusted to 
the job 
94.9 92.6 88.7 
Changing jobs 2 2 4 
Getting a diploma or a 
recognized 
qualification 
3.1 5.4 7.2 
TRAINING WITH 
CERTIFICATION 
   
Yes 7.7 9 12.9 
LENGTH OF THE 
TRAINING 
PERIOD (IN 
HOURS) 
   
Median Value 16 24 24 
Mean Value 46.7 75.2 150.4 
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Table 6: Breakdown of the Total Variance 
into the Sum of Between and Within Groups Variances 
 
Type of Variance Value and Share (in percentage) 
Overall Variance 32.33 (100%) 
Between Groups Variance 1.78 (5.5%) 
Within Groups Variance 30.55 (94.5%) 
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Table 7: Contributions of the Explanatory Variables to the Between Groups Variance 
 
Explanatory Variables Contribution (in percentage) 
Higher Education Diploma 3.55 
Holder of “Baccalauréat” -1.31 
Holds a CAP or BEP 1.82 
Holds a BEPC 0.35 
Holds a CEP 17.04 
“Specialized” Worker  6.10 
“Qualified”Worker 2.71 
Engineer or Managerial 
Position 
13.13 
Employee 2.14 
Other Professions -0.28 
Has a Work Contract of 
Undetermined Duration 
0.32 
Other Categories of Trainees 0.003 
Seniority in Firm 1.53 
Square of Seniority in firm -0.37 
Age 9.61 
Square of Age -11 
Works Full-time (40 hours at 
least) 
15 
Works Part-time (30 to 40 
hours) 
-0.61 
Works Part-time (less than  15 5.07 
 40 
hours) 
Has the Same Work Schedule 
Every Day 
0.75 
Has a Variable Work Schedule -0.12 
Received Vocational Training 170 
Mill’s Ratio -135.03 
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Table 8: Contributions of the Explanatory Variables to the Within Groups Variance 
 
Explanatory Wariables Individuals Belonging to 
Group A (Did not Receive any 
Vocational Training)  
Individuals Belonging to 
Group B (Received  Vocational 
Training)  
Higher Education Diploma 1.31 3.042 
Holder of “Baccalauréat” -0.20 0.062 
Holds a CAP or BEP -0.027 1.78 
Holds a BEPC 0.018 0.48 
Holds a CEP 5.57 3.16 
“Specialized” Worker  1.70 0.9527 
“Qualified”Worker -0.062 0.851 
Engineer or Managerial 
Position 
6.91 14.64 
Employee 7.12 7.60 
Other Professions -0.034 0.027 
Has a Work Contract of 
Undetermined Duration 
0.22 0.393 
Other Categories of Trainees 0.0016 0.0058 
Seniority in Firm 3.74 4.74 
Square of Seniority in firm -1.32 -1.53 
Age 1.97 9.85 
Square of Age -1.19 -7.50 
Works Full-time (40 hours at 
least) 
27.67 18.19 
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Works Part-time (30 to 40 
hours) 
-1.80 -1.57 
Works Part-time (less than 15  
Hours) 
9.48 2.68 
Has the Same Work Schedule 
Every Day 
0.084 0.060 
Has a Variable Work Schedule 0.048 -0.13 
Mill’s Ratio 3.72 8.17 
Residuals 36.72 34.02 
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Table 9: Contribution of the Explanatory Variables of the Regression of Table 3  
to the Variance of the Within group B Variance 
 
 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Contributioo (in 
percentage) to the 
Variance of the Within 
Group B Variance 
Training originated 
in individual 
initiative* 
0.16 
Training originated 
in inititiative from 
firm* 
-0.63 
Training originated 
in initiative from 
both the individual 
and the firm* 
1.026 
The individual 
financed the 
training** 
0.178 
Other type of 
Financing** 
1.651 
Residual of the 
Regression of 
Table 3 
31.64 
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Table 10: Breakdown of the Overall Variance of the Logarithm of Wages 
 
 
Type of Variance Value 
Between Groups Variance of Actual 
(Logarithms of) Incomes  
0.018 
    - Contribution of Vocational Training 
(Dummy Variable “Received Vocational 
Training” Plus Mills Ratio) 
0.006 
    - Contribution of Other Variables 0.012 
Variance of Predicted (Logarithms of) Incomes 0.213 
    - Between Groups Variance of Predicted 
(Logarithms of) Incomes 
0.018 
    - Within Groups Variance of Predicted 
(Logarithms of) Incomes 
0.195 
           - Contribution of the group who did not 
receive any vocational training (group A) 
0.145 
           - Contribution of the group who 
received vocational training (group B) 
0.050 
Variance of Actual (Logarithms of) Incomes 0.323 
    - Between Groups Variance of Actual 
(Logarithms of) Incomes 
0.018 
    - Within Groups Variance of Actual 
(Logarithms of) Incomes 
0.306 
           - Contribution of the group who did not 
receive any vocational training (group A) 
0.230 
           - Contribution of the group who 
received vocational training (group B) 
0.076 
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Table 11: Simple Correlation Coefficient Between the Explanatory Variables  
of the Regression and the Logarithm of Wages 
 
Variable Group of Individuals who 
Received Training 
Group of Individuals who did 
not Receive any Training 
Higher Education Diploma 0.344 0.254 
Holder of “Baccalauréat” -0.138 0.593 
Holds a CAP or BEP -0.132 0.213 
Holds a BEPC 0.000 0.000 
Holds a CEP -0.167 -0.246 
“Specialized” Worker -0.139 -0.158 
“Qualified”Worker -0.136 0.933 
Engineer or Managerial 
Position 
0.554 0.426 
Employee -0.386 -0.333 
Other Professions -0.133 0.224 
Has a Work Contract of 
Undetermined Duration 
0.199 0.102 
Other Categories of Trainees -0.136 -0.377 
Seniority in Firm 0.263 0.225 
Square of Seniority in firm 0.232 0.213 
Age 0.253 0.394 
Square of Age 0.260 0.522 
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Works Full-time (40 hours at 
least) 
0.419 0.579 
Works Part-time (30 to 40 
hours) 
-0.998 -0.119 
Works Part-time (less than  15  
hours) 
-0.237 -0.432 
Has the Same Work Schedule 
Every Day 
-0.153 -0.239 
Has a Variable Work Schedule 0.495 -0.214 
Mill’s Ratio -0.526 -0.405 
 
